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You have the scientific spirit hilt where is your spirit? The strength o f  a 
man's virtue must not he measured by his efforts, hut by his ordinary life 
- Pascal
Abstract
Many countries in the world, including the less developed ones, 
acknowledge that socio-economic development will rely for a good part 
on the rapidity o f  progress in and adoption o f science and technology. 
As such, school systems have been asked to provide challenging and 
stimulating science programmes that lead to scientific literacy fo r all. 
However, despite the heavy injection o f scarce funds and resources to 
support various science education reform programmes, evaluation 
studies show disappointingly, that the level o f scientific literary among 
students and their communities has not risen proportionately to 
expectations in most developing countries. The programmes generally 
do not appear to produce telling effects in these societies in the long 
term. Science educators have, on reflection, begun to look to socio­
cultural studies in order to better understand the problems o f acquiring 
scientific literacy in non-Western contexts. These studies collectively 
find problematic the time-honoured assumption in science education 
that culturally acquired thought and belief patterns can he readily and 
simply supplanted by Western scientific rationality leading to 'progress' 
or to 'development'. This paper explores and articulates the direction 
school science and science teacher education should take in order to 
enhance the potential to achieve more global scientific literacy in non- 
Western developing countries. For there to be meaningful and useful 
adoption o f  scientific values and habits, it is argued that there is a need 
fo r  science education in developing countries to concern itself with the 
understanding and critical interrogation o f  the rationality o f  Western 
science relative to localIv held world views.
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Introduction
In this paper i seek to draw attention to the need for science education in 
developing countries to concern itself with the understanding and 
critical interrogation of the rationality of Western science relative to 
locally held world views. John Dewey (1927) once raised a concern 
with the potential problems related to untrammelled and unreflective 
use of science and technology by stating:
... the machine age in developing the Great Society had invaded 
and partially disintegrated the smaller communities of former 
times without generating a Great Community (p.27).
In the developing countries, science and technology have been 
embraced as a means to achieving social and economic development, 
'flu's thrust is evident from the general the goals of science education 
which by and large minor of those of the more developed countries in 
the West (Krugly-Smolska, 2007). Goals of science education 
increasingly emphasize science education for all citizens so that they 
may be knowledgeable participants in dealing with and solving 
problems arising from the increased use of science and technology 
(Sliumba, 1993). Furthermore, greater emphasis is given to the ability 
to use science and technological knowledge to solve every day 
problems and to make decisions on societal issues
All in all, the umbrella goal is the development of scientific and 
technological literacy. Krugly-Smolska (2007) indicates that the goal of 
scientific and technological literacy arose “of a need for individual 
development along with national development in developing 
countries” (p.479). The goals of scientific and technological literacy are 
premised on and seek the development of human resources and 
extending the human capacity to cope with the physical, social and 
technological environment. However, science and technology are not 
entirely virtuous as often taken for granted. With this in mind, a higher 
level of critical reflection on science and technology is desirable, 
especially in non Western developing countries where the adoption of a 
science and technology is seen as a panacea to all developmental 
challenges.
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A survey of the literature review s shows that science curricula in Africa 
and other developing countries are closely modelled to those in the West 
(Lewin, 2010; Ogawa. 2007: Ogunniyi. I9XN): and dial in fact their 
goals are largely similar in scope (Kruglv-Smolska. 2007). In many ol 
the developing countries, examinations are the chief means by which 
educational achiev ements are measured. Whether or not they arc able to 
serve as indicators of scientific and technological literacy is subject to 
debate. However, assessments based on examinations are important it 
we should be able to make some judgment of the success in science 
education in the developing countries. One such example is the 1I£A 
assessments (Posticthwaite. 1991 ). A 19S4 If.A assessment ol junior 
secondary students showed that the bottom 2<•*’<> oi the students in the 
developing countries including Nigeria. The Philippines. Zimbabwe, 
and others were 'scientifically illiterate'. The top 30"n consistently 
scored at bottom of 23 nations surveyed on the literacy measures 
applied (Posliethwaile. 1991). A recent analysis ol examination results 
in Zimbabwe revealed that of nearly 120 000 candidates taking the 
compulsory Core Science examinations in 1900. only- 20"o achieved a 
pass of GCE grade C or better (Shumba. 1992). A recent survey of 
science teachers in Zimbabwe shows that they associate science with 
the production of useful technology and the improvement ol human 
welfare (Shumba, 1995a). They do not see science as parsimonious and 
tentative, but perceive it in terms of a single-fixed scientific method 
with a determinate number of procedural steps. The teachers fail to 
recognize the arbitrary nature of models and classification schemes 
used in science. They fail to recognize curiosity and human creativity as 
the fundamental driving force in the advancemeni of science. Overall, 
there is greater tendency among the teachers to view science in an 
authoritarian manner, where it is viewed as an unchanging body ol 
knowledge amassed via the application of determinate scientific 
methods. They therefore hold a textbook view of science as body of 
knowledge and immutable laws. Student attitudes towards science, in 
Zimbabwe at least, seem to wane as students' progress from primary 
school, to junior secondary, and to high school (Shumba. 1993).
Evidence also exists to suggest that students do not necessarily utilize 
what they learn in science education in real life, for example, Morris
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(1983) observed that in Africa, students go through the audio of 
memorizing what is necessary to pass tests and examinations after 
which they return to the security of their traditional beliefs. The African 
student appears to learn science in ways which contradicts the 
approaches suggested in science curricula. Odhiambo suggests that the 
reasons Africans tend to learn by wrote is “simply because what is 
presented to them as science is alien to their ordinary circumstances and 
life" (p.40). Odhiambo further claims that science teaching has:
... only resulted in his (African) learning facts, procedures and 
techniques, but has not yet become inbuilt with the spirit of 
science, with a scientific way of looking at nature and with a 
scientific manner of approaching new programmes (p.43).
Jahoda (as cited in Swift, 2008), found evidence o f persistent traditional 
superstitious beliefs among Ghanaian undergraduates, “the beliefs 
existing in a state of cognitive co-existence with Western science 
education, but emerging more under stress” (p. 15). In an interview with 
teachers who were enrolled for a degree programme in science 
(Shumba, 1995b), a biology teacher remarked: “I don’t see how science 
can interfere with my belief I still have my beliefs... so 1 still have my 
beliefs, they are there, science is there too". Using the sample of 
teachers, Shumba (in press), found that science teachers were 
themselves not strong traditionalists but maintained a fairly traditional 
posture with regards to aspects of traditional authority, religion, view of 
nature and social change. They showed a much stronger shift from 
tradition with regard to sex roles, causality, and problem solving.
Experiences of Westerners who have had some opportunity to work in 
Africa also suggest that scientific literacy is seen as Western. A decade 
ago, an American Professor recollected is experience in a Nigerian 
Teacher's college where he found:
... students who were seeking simple answers to complex 
scientific phenomena, distressed by the tentative nature of 
scientific enterprise ... To illustrate the frustration that the level 
o f sure and fixed knowledge can generate, one student made a 
public appeal that 1 teach what scientist were sure of! (Shrigley, 
2006, p.427).
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A recent comparatives study of teachers in, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, 
and the Philippines found that irrespective of their non-Western cultural 
background, the teachers held views distinct from the science they 
teach. They exhibited a form of collateral thinking whereby “an 
individual expects or uses both mechanistic and anthromorphic 
explanations depending on the context in questions and without 
exhibiting any sign of cognitive dissonance” (Ogunniyi, Jegede, 
Ogawa, Yandila & Oladelc, 1995). In the sixties, Odhiambo (1980) 
made a claim that “an African must find a connecting link between the 
principles o f natural science and basic assumptions o f his world-view, 
or he is lost” (p.45). Prophet (2007) working in Botswana observes that 
there is discontinuity between the common view of reality and the 
scientific which should concern us. Yakubu (1994) conjectures that “the 
scientific education given in the developing countries has not 
succeeded in instilling the scientific spirit in the educated: the 
indigenous 'common-sense' knowledge is so deeply rooted that it 
appears difficulty to change” (p.344). While this is not to suggest that 
Africans or people in other developing countries cannot understand or 
appreciate science and technology; the suggestion is that the 
spontaneous application of the scientific spirit learnt through Western 
form of education is lacking. Yakubu (1994) goes on to suggest that:
... there seems there is something which inhibits spontaneous 
application o f scientific ideas to problem situations. The 
inhibition is very likely to be the deep-seated indigenous and 
cultural behaviour patterns acquired before western education 
was received (p.344).
These citations o f achievement studies and socio-eultural research raise 
a possibility that science and technology literacy, the umbrella goal o f 
science education is not being achieved, at least when assessed from the 
Western point o f view. The vast amounts of investment in science 
education do not seem to find a match in improved standards of living. 
Yakubu (1994) observes that, in Africa at least, techniques developed 
way in the past are used “since time immemorial without change” 
(p.344). This suggests that the inventiveness assumed to characterize a 
scientific literate person is lacking or not appreciably developed.
Some researchers, like Williams (1994), would have the world believe
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I hill ";i major goal of \mencc education must ho to dispel notions >i 
magic and ideology as unscientific" (p. 516). Rather than seek u> 
develop literaev. the coal ol'seience become> that ol'eradicating belief 
systems ol'ihose dial get exposed lo it. ( oberti (2007) suggests that this 
view is based on a cult tire del toil theory where traditional cultures are 
only seen as different bn’ are tacit!) assumed to be less rationale than 
modem Wesiern culture, unfortunately this view of the role o f seieru. 
education may be supported, albeit saiiemK by political leaders in th 
developing world who nia\ hold prnoiematic assumptions, for 
example, political headers in live developing countries presupposelha 
science and leehnologv can and should sow social and economic 
development much like what happened m the developed work! 
( I ’obern. I 9X9>. An exampk of iltis is /m ihabv e's five 'tear National
l)e\clopmeni Plan lor the period lo o p .! 005 which slated that 
"development ol'seience and technology ts /tmbabwe's long term and 
most important strategy for economic and social development” (p.84). 
Along w ith this hierarchical assumption ol the iciationship ol'seience, 
technology, and development is the absurd login ’hat the purposes of 
education in science and icchnology will lead to the eradication of 
superstitious belief's held by many in the developing countries. For 
example, well placed gov eminent officials in Zimbabwe hold this view 
also prevailing in the developed countries who themselves have 
assumed that transl'erand adoption ol'Western scientific knowledge and 
technologies should produce the desired effect of'modernising' these 
cultures. Chanakira (1686) once proclaimed that:
... science is one of man's intellectual achievements. It unfolds a 
picture of the physical world, enables man to extend his 
knowledge and to exercise control over his environment. In 
consequence, it is possible for him to reduce poverty, disease 
and other burdens plus releases him from some of his primitive 
fears and superstitions (Zimfep, 1986: p. 145; emphasis added).
While acknowledging the intellectual nature of the scientific enterprise, 
a problematic assumption is that exposure to science leads to a rejection 
o f currently held perceptions and views of the world and the implicit 
assumption that this should necessarily happen. The value judgement 
implicit in this view is that Westernized scientific rationality is
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inherently good, and that people ought to abandon native cultural 
beliefs to embrace it.
Drori (1993) conducted an analysis which produces innovations which 
in turn leads to economic development in the less developed countries. 
Asecond model, the 'symmetric model' argues that:
science affects national development by transmitting values of 
development and modernization, while technology offers 
'solutions' for the connection between resources and local 
economic needs. These epistemological considerations define 
science, technology and development, and social filter 
processes affect the adoption of such definitions (p. 203; 
emphasis added).
In short, this latter model assumes that inventive activity must occur in 
the local context rather than mere adoption of knowledge from and 
finished products. Assuming that the business of science education is to 
supplant rather than supplement cultural thought and belief patterns 
demonstrates a serious negation as well as under valuation of cultural 
thought. And this may be what has been so wrong with science 
education in the developing non-Western countries.
While arguments about the nature of the world in science materials and 
science education literature are mostly presented from the vantage 
point of the scientific world view', the evidence presented suggests that 
students in developing countries may not have developed a bias 
towards a scientific interpretation of the w'orld. Two issues emerge from 
the foregoing. Firstly, scientific and technological literacy as 
determined by Western standards is not being efficiently achieved w ith 
students in developing countries. Secondly, the obvious neglect of the 
cultural context o f leaching and learning in science education has not 
been helpful to efforts to develop scientific and technological literacy in 
those countries. Because most science curricula in Africa are modelled 
on those in the West, their content fail to make a clear distinction 
between traditional ways of viewing the world and that of science 
(Cobcrn, 1993# 2007; Ogawa. 2007; Ogunniyi. 19X8).
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Situating science teaching and learning in cultural 
context
Odhiambo (1968) raised the need for “the recognition that there are 
certain cultural ideas in the African situation which may well impinge 
directly on the ease with which an African child can appreciate science” 
(p.42). More recently. Cobcrn (1993 & 2007). Ogawa (2007), Ogunniyi 
(1988), and Swift (2008) raise the issue of the need to relate science 
more closely to the learner's societal or cultural environment. In his 
review, Swift (2008) concludes that:
... the bulk of the evidence appears traditional beliefs are an 
enduring component of indigenous knowledge and thought 
processes that the science and technology education must work 
with, in Africa and elsewhere in the 'developing world' (p. 16).
Ingle and Turner (2011) find that the way of thinking by pupils from 
different cultures are different from Western scientific modes of 
thought. While some, like Odhiambo, make the erroneous assumption 
that “the irrelevance of cause and effect and the irrelevance of the need 
for hypotheses for advancing or knowledge of nature is perhaps the 
most serious gap between the African's world-view and Western 
science” (p. 45), the issue raised hinges on the potential problems of the 
intercourse between traditional culture and Western science.
Horton's (1971) analysis refutes this 'irrelevance of cause and effect' 
assumption of Odhiambo. For example, basing on scientific, 
anthropological, and philosophical analysis, Horton shows that 
cognitively, cultures do not differ in terms of their primary theory. 
Primary theoretical thinking involves the world of common-sense 
observation and experience. Explanations for observations and 
experience are based on the personalized idiom whereby social 
relationships among humans, between humans and spirits, and between 
humans and objects take precedence. A this level of theoretical 
development and explanation, the reasoning pattern is largely 
cosmological and the things on which explanation is based on, for 
example gods, spirits, and ancestors, are not subject to experimentation. 
On the other hand, Horton proposes a secondary theory to which 
societies and cultures eventually develop. In secondary theory,
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interpretations or explanations are based on intangible entities and i! 
establishes relationships between ideas and ideas. Relative to primary 
theory, secondary theory is at a higher level and Western scientific 
thought has considerably developed upon it. A significant point then h  
that, in the primary theoretical system which would be predominant in 
traditional culture, causality is based on human volition (im. the 
personalized and subjective idiom) rather than in that of the materia1 
world.
Horton (1971) suggests an important difference between traditional 
thinking and science as that “in traditional cultures there is no 
developed awareness of alternatives to the established body "l 
theoretical beliefs, whereas in scientifically oriented cultures, such an 
awareness is highly developed” (p. 230). This makes traditional 
cultures to be 'closed’ v. bile the latter are 'open' 'fhe closed 
predicaments can be tounu in attitudes pertaining to the prediction 
events, to cause and effect, towards experiment, towards confession oi 
ignorance, towards coincidence, chance and probability, altitudes lo 
problem solving, and attitudes towards time. These attitudes me amply 
summarized by Ingle and Turner (2011, p. 364). Horton f 1 9 71) gi ves a 
more detailed analysis and critique of these and other attitudes, Sbumba 
(1995b) provides a summary of the cultural values and norm', in 
Zimbabwe.
1) Attitudes towards the prediction of events: Although both the 
traditionalist and the scientist are concerned w ith the prediction 
o f events, the former will find excuses for each successive 
failure while the latter would modify the theory. The 
traditionalist also fails to sec the incorrectness of his or her 
theory or knowledge.
2) Attitudes towards cause and effect: The traditionalist tends to 
converging causal sequencing where, for example, an illness 
can be linked to multiple causes, i.e., when action is taken to 
deal with one cause and the action fails, another cause is sought, 
which is supposedly a complicating factor. Regardless of the 
number o f failures the theory is retained and not discarded.
3) Attitudes towards experiment: Traditional thinkers lend to wait 
for events to come along and show the validity of a theory while 
scientific thinkers would put the theory to the test of
’ IS()vcr\nn Simml'd
experiment.
4) Attitudes towards confession of ignorance: Traditional thinker- 
are reluctant to confess ignorance about the answer to am 
questions including natural calamities such as floods, disease o 
droughts.
5) Attitudes towards coincidence, chance and probability 
Explanations for any calamity are always sought and the idea o r 
chance, probability or coincidence is simply not well 
developed.
6) Attitudes towards time: Traditionalists tend to see things as 
having been better in the past.
7) Attitudes to problem solving: Traditional thinkers tend to accept 
solutions to problems invented in the past instead of inventing 
solutions to present problems. Solutions have to be 
remembered. Solutions to problems tend to be transmitted from 
generation to generation.
While Yakubu (1994) observes that the gap between the aims and 
values of science and technology and indigenous culture is not -.cry 
wide since both are engaged in explaining and controlling the 
environment, he observes a clear gap exists in that science uses a 
systematic experimental technique which is “completely absent in 
indigenous thought and practice" (p. 344) and thus techniques 
developed way in the past are used “since time immemorial without 
change” (p. 344). Further, he notes that while indigenous thought and 
practice is rational and pragmatic, it has what Skorupski (! 976) termed 
building 'blocks of falsifiability' which makes it non-tentative and 
unaware of its limitations. Yakubu (1994) says this is problematic since: 
... even though people have been well educated in science, when 
they are faced with problems and the discarding of old ideas and 
the construction o f new and better ones, they lind it difficult to 
give the old ones up. Sometimes the scientific solutions are put 
aside and the indigenous ideas adhered to. The ease with which 
this is sometimes done can be worrying: reasons are always 
found to maintain the status quo (p. 343).
Teaching and learning science non-western countries, particularly 
those in Africa, should therefore seek to bring both scientific way of
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thinking and traditional rationality into some imm ->i -in. , >,• 
hopefully leading to some meaningful conflation O rn iinh  ll«' r.nmre 
and nurture of the interactions should not simpi\ Iv ignore*! >r 
disregarded, as mostly the case in the past and current ly.
Science education, curriculum and pedagogy
The importance of culture vis-a-vis learning is articulate-1 b\ Saljao 
(1991) who posits that it is no longer tenable to assume i hut percept ion, 
attention, memory, reasoning and other similar processes an- 
unaffected by culture. In short, cognitive phenomena are telated <e 
culture. Saljao says culture is “what allows us to pereeb e 'be world os 
meaningful and coherent and at the same time it operates a a eonsV. aint 
on our understandings and activities" (p.180). Culture in d if  *i ^ • t<I 
serves as a filter through which we perceive the work! an-1 h' ikIcm it 
intelligible. Saljao als< ' s the point that “human expen w  s are 
inescapably cultural in nature, learning and growth ink-’ >.v '■ hhm
cultural boundaries" (p. 184). Stanley and Briekbouso i d e l i  fjml 
problematic the universalistie assumption of science education and 
suggest that we need to develop a multicultural perspective < >n seient >fk 
knowledge. The universalistie assumption suppose* tliat science is 
science, and science is the same throughout the world <Ingle <C Turner, 
2011). Thus Western science content and methods can he transferred to 
the Third World without consideration of the cultural milieu at the 
pupils. Concomitant with this assumption is the erroneous \ u. w point of 
“Western science embodied in school curricula usurp traditional belies 
systems and attempt to change practice" (Ingle & Turner. 4 )1!. p J60).
The problem currently analyzed is that science education cannot afford 
to pretend to be accultural since it produces effect on the societal system 
which it is introduced. For example, when a society is tradit ional and its 
belief system is founded on mythology, such a society is expected to 
adjust and accommodate the 'stress' from the interaction with science. 
Ingle and Turner (2011) suggest three ways by which the adjustment 
might occur, viz. (a) social disintegration due to the overpowering 
effect of the stress, (b) acceptance o f the challenge in an idealized form 
and thus it will be less powerful than it can be, and (e) assimilation and 
coexistence o f old and new ideas. The latter, assimilation, is a thinking 
process whereby new ideas are pondered, compared to existing beliefs.
and find a place among existing beliefs. In other words, there f. 
productive confrontation between the new and the old. This can happen 
in revolutionary fashion where displacement oceuis withoui 
assimilation or in an evolutionary fashion where the new i: 
accommodated with assimilation and integration.
Science education in developing countries has sadly been revolutionary 
rather than evolutionary and thus its impact has been unfortunately 
limited. Ogawa (2007) and Ogunniyi (1988) propose that science 
education should be relativised so that it can be seen within the context 
o f students' indigenous culture. Ogunniyi (1988) suggested that for the 
scientific world view to succeed in traditional societies, “tin urn should 
be geared towards accommodation rather than assimilatior .. .the aim 
of science education I am proposing here should not be to supplant or 
denigrate a traditional culture but to help people meet modern 
challenges” (p.8).
Another point concerns pedagogy. L.ew'in (2010) observes that 
pedagogical approaches do not always travel well aeror • cultures but 
unfortunately the science education community has not been fast in 
recognizing and/ or accepting this. He makes the following worthy 
observation:
The contradictions which may be involved in teachers moving 
towards teaching methods that stress enquiry, unfettered 
questioning, challenges to traditional beliefs, and the lodging of 
authority in the physical world o f experiment and hypothesis 
testing, in communities where none of these things is the normal 
conduct of affairs, require forethought. If the purpose of 
teaching science is partly to hasten the development of a 
gessellsschaft grounded in the rationality of scientific thinking, 
it may require an approach that not simply confront and d.isnfss 
beliefs that are widely shared (p. 17).
Jegede and Okebukola (2007) posit what they call the conceptual eco- 
cultural paradigm in which the growth and development of an 
individual's perception of knowledge is made to draw from the eco- 
cultural environment in which the learner lives and operates. They 
suggest that the science curriculum should be modelled along the
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Alric^r. thought system which the learner brings to the classroom and 
uses as the conceptual f ramework for constructing personal ideas about 
phenomena. The curriculum should base and utilize the African view of 
nature and the traditional cosmology, a point substantiated by Cobern 
(2007), Ogawa (2007), Ogunniyi (1988), and numerous others. Among 
objectives Jegede and Okebukola (2007) propose is the need for 
teaching values of the typical African feelings in relation to and in the 
practice of (science and) technology as a human enterprise (p. 45). They 
recommend that the curriculum and instruction for learners of non- 
Western society “'must begin with and reflect on the world views they 
already possess" (p.46).
fins is especially appropriate if we note the findings of Prophet's (2007) 
research in Botswana. Prophet finds that the values instilled in the home 
are in fundamental disagreement with the spirit of inquiry; and critical 
attitude is actively discouraged and this is probably reflected in the 
passive, accepting atmosphere observed in the classroom. Learning is 
unrefleciive and by rote; the teachers see themselves as authority 
figures whose word is not questioned, and most pupils simply want 
clear instructions of what is expected of them and clear standards 
against w hich they must perform (p. 20).
Rakow and Bermudez f 1993) report on evidence from research w'hich 
shewed that Mexican American families emphasize conformity and 
solidarity and as a result individuals in that culture tend to respond to 
“adult and family expectations rather than to self-directed goals. 
Consequently, their focus of control is external as they pursue the 
opinion of others to validate their own experiences” (p. 672). Kay 
(1975) provides an interesting case study of Kenya where he observes 
that educational changes must compete for allegiance with long 
standing traditions which must be taken into account in curricula 
development and implementation. For example, he notes an attempt to 
introduce a child centred curriculum there. The pupils, especially from 
rural areas, had been socialized to leant by listening to storytelling, by 
direct observation but not participation, and were socialized to work 
cooperatively. At an early age, the children were taught values and 
attitudes related to collectivism and submission which were the 
antithesis of “spontaneity, self-reliance and individualism being
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■t.i 111 schools' (p. 188). The authority of’agc and respect of older
persons was a well ingrained virtue and personal decision making “does 
nos appear to be a part o f the cultural baggage” (p. 189). Teachers 
them wkv , nicked with implementing the 'progressive1 curriculum' 
carried the .-.ame values and failed to put themselves on equal footing 
wadi then pupils and therefore remained stern authorities in their 
eiasN.ooms. As a nation Kenya “is very intent upon preserving its 
traditional heritage and culture” (p. 190); similarly, Cobern (2007) 
uoie- diat "the advancement of science and science education often 
compete:, with national interest in maintaining the integrity of 
traditional etilnne” (p. 6).
Ka < l1'" '-! inaive-, ail observation which could be true today in many 
\ iVienn i oi ii ii i i Ldi a l  while “both pupils and teachers are of a culture 
winch undergoing significant changes, persists in cherishing certain 
traditions at id actions” the curriculum design process “has not even 
iv.'ogin/cj these t y | res o f problems, let alone found effective ways of 
dealing aim them” (p. 190). Prophet (2007) concludes that a new 
v„ K m e eduv a l ion should be a synthesis of the “esteem for the richness 
of Air,can cultural \ nines and humanistic traditions combined with the 
know ledge, values and attitudes needed to understand and control the 
world oi tv,i.,v’ (p.2 !).
Tin. Oe.. ; pud !) model, later extended by Ogunniyi (1988), raises 
"greatest concerns, considering the aims of science education is how we 
can bring science as a culture into their traditional or fundamental 
wdm; > . .. u >_vnip,uc the traditional and the scientific view of man and 
naiiii v i -a .!••>. of thinking, and to clarify similarities and differences 
bei wren thenf' (p i ! 5). Ogawa (2007) proposes that science education 
slu. <u id ! nakc sti idem:; aware of:
i i liwn n.iviiiioiKil culture
j i clnnaclei lslies of science as culture which has different view of 
man and nature, a different way of thinking 
i v samples ofeonflicts between scientific and traditional ways of 
iiunking m everyday life, and 
i ; iraining m decision making related to science
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Obviously one would expect that science should supplement rather than 
replace their cultural background. Swift (2008) cites Mazrui who finds 
that some African academics are experiencing cultural isolation 
because they "have allowed Western science and technology to replace 
rather than supplement their cultural background” (p. 3). Overall, it 
appears that Western science is transferring to developing countries 
without its essence and consequently does little to improve the overall 
human capacity. Science educators in the developing countries are 
challenged to take seriously the issue of cultural thought vis-avis 
scientific thinking. A serious re-evaluation of traditional culture in 
science education is required. Ogawa (2007) suggests that science 
should be view ed in a cultural context and relativised and that science as 
a culture should be seen within the context of students' traditional 
culture Science educators should take heed of these suggestions if they 
are to avoid presenting science dogmatically. They must assist teachers 
understand the kinds of interactions that occur when science encounters 
local cultures: otherwise, there is possibility of uncritical acceptance or 
even rejection.
Scientistic vies of science and the assumption of virtuosity
Another problem confounding efforts to develop scientific and 
technological literacy in developing countries is the lack of critical 
reflection and analysis of the nature of science itself. There is docile 
acceptance of the value of science and technology especially as they are 
construed to have a link to 'progress and development' and therefore 
virtuous. This attitude and belief is subjectively strengthened by the 
unnecessary dichotomy: Choose traditional values or choose 
Westernized values as practised in the past (and currently) in science 
education. There is always the attendant danger of replacing traditional 
world views with the new dogma o f unquestioned science.
Skolomowski (1974) criticizes the mechanistic and materialistic 
conceptions of progress at the expense of “other concepts of progress, 
of a metaphysical and religious variety” (p. 53) as an illusion. He 
characterizes the Western concept of progress in five ways:
1) Pragmatic: Progress mainly preoccupied with material gains 
and practical improvements of the immediate future.
2) Empiricist: World is viewed as made up of physical parts
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i,itcitiding mechanically.
51 Scientist: Laws of physical science viewed as tools by means of 
wh ieh we manipulate the physical universe.
4) f.Aploilive: Conquering, controlling, and exploiting 
nonchalantly and ruthlessly ofnatural resources and balances in 
lhe ecosystem.
5 ) Fit list: Progress benefits a few at the expense of the many and at 
the expense of natural resources belonging to all.
Siiiiiiaiiy. (/guuniyi (1988) suggests that while the achievements of 
science me for all to see, assumptions such as above make the 
appreciation of science and technology in developing countries a little 
11 mi c ] iioblcmatic.
In his anuIv is, Skolomowski (1974) concludes that “the progress of 
science and progress in general are two different things" (p. 60) and that 
“the metaphysics of progress is based on an exploitive and parasitic 
torn, of philosophy. Progress has been a cover-up for Western man's 
lollies hi manipulating the external world (p. 77). While we have 
,io , iiul benefits and advantages such as better medical care, better 
living standards, better and more efficient communication services, and 
extended our life expectancy, the Western form of progress has 
disrupted ways of life of other cultures without significant gains in 
Western standards of living, depleted natural resources, caused 
ecological imbalances, and created ways o f life in which “we have 
disengaged the individual from the variety of interactions with nature 
and oilier people in which lie was engaging in former ways of life” (p. 
78). The question for science educators is whether they can afford to 
have the dichotomy: Choose Westernized values or traditional values 
which for a long time have been the obvious choice o f colonists and 
cultural imperialists. The stance by science teachers in Zimbabwe is a 
counter to this point; they acknowledge the value of science but 
admittedly have not abandoned their traditional beliefs and values in 
order to embrace it. In fact, in the research by Shumba (1995), 
Zimbabwean science teachers are themselves not strong traditionalists 
but maintained a fairly traditional posture with regards to aspects of 
traditional authority, religion, view of nature, and social change. They 
showed a much stronger shift from tradition with regard to sex roles, 
causality., and problem solving.
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From my point of view, this balance of tradition and change is laudable. 
Loss of tradition means the loss of cult ural cohesion because scientific 
thinking, for all its power to explain physical phenomena, is incapable 
of providing a unifying view of life. While science and technological 
advancements are appreciated, science fails as a unifying mctaphysic 
((William & Cobern, personal communication, 6 April 1995). Further, 
science and technology helped to create a plethora of modem ailments 
that can be traced to anxiety, stress, pointlessness, and pollution. 
Science and technology cannot guarantee social cohesion like tradition 
does; people influenced by Western values are disconnected from one 
another and from their environment; and social alienation is a serious 
even fatalistic problem. On the same issues, Michael O'Loughlin 
(personal communication. 6 April 1995) provides a useful critique 
noting that indigenous culture is resilient and conservative in order to 
maintain itself. On the other hand. Western science, economics and 
international aid are often imperialistic. Not all of Western science is 
virtuous as commonly noted about the role of pharmaceutical and 
petrochemical multinationals in environmental despoliation and 
deforestation in South America, displacement of native agricultural 
practices and dietary habits, etc.
What passes for science education is dogmatic. It is another ideology 
with all of its own baggage so that while the public face of science and 
the scientific method is that of objectivity and rationality, it is deeply 
ideologically bound and can be deployed as a means of oppression and 
mystification (Birch. 1988; Boulding, 1970; Kelly, Carisen & 
Cunningham, 1993; Hodson, 1993; Skolimowski, 1974). O’Loughlin 
suggests that the issue for science education should be “less of an 
attempt to displace one mind-set and replace it with a more 'scientific' 
but rather to bring them both into conversation in some critical ways” 
(personal communication, 6 April 1995). This raises a possibility that 
traditional cultures are not monolithic and totally closed relative to 
scientific rationality, rather the resistance to the tenets of the 
Westernized world view embodied in science could perhaps suggest 
that traditional culture may be open to other possibilities such as 
conceptualizing emancipator, environmentally and socially conscious 
scientific enquiry.
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Boulding (19/0) suggested that in some sense die scieiiliiie subculture 
could serve to disorganise society rather than move it towards progress. 
Some of the virtues are in stark contradiction to values held within 
traditional cultures. Idr example. \ eraeity and curiosity. As he says folk 
proverbs show that curiosity killed the cat. On the other hand "the 
scientific subculture, and the technological superculture' it has 
produced, are not and probably cannot be a complete culture" 
(Boulding. 1970, p. 17). Bouldinglhen pauses is ihai:
What we have to think o f ihcicfoie. is much more ul a 
symbiosis between the scientific sulu ulmre and the other 
subcultures with which it interacts, rather than any sort of 
conquest ol the oilier cultures by a kind of'universal church or 
culture of science (p. 17).
It is our problem as science educalms m ciealc this symbiosis and "the 
impact o f the various subcultures on each other. pa< Ocularly in regard to 
their value systems” (Boulding. 1970, p. !7 1 Appleyard. Marty. 
Boorstin and Alices (1993) also express scepticism on the virtuous 
nature of science by stating:
Science is not an imioeeni commodity which ean be employed 
as a convenience by people u islting to partake only of the West's 
material power. Rather it is spiritually corrosiv e, burning away 
ancient authority and traditions. Science, which pretends to be 
all-knowing, cannot coexist with alternative belief systems (p. 
52).
They further critique science and the ;,cicrit! in. m.uhnti tor being simply 
“inadequate for coping with the soul of man. which required 
explanations and guides for living they cannot olfct " (p. 53). Appleyard 
and his colleagues also feel that an entirely scientific society cannot 
work, “though full of rationality and discovery, it fails to shed any light 
on the distressing phrase 'the reason to live” (p 55).
Cobern (1993) depicts science as a powei rui cultural force which 
threatens, needlessly, the integrity ol a traditional culture. Therefore, 
wc find that science and technology am criticized on moral and ethical 
grounds. Mundangepfupfu (1989) criticizes science partly because it 
“cannot inform us about the reality of beliefs about morals, values, art,
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magic, etc.” (p.49). Ziman (1971) suggested that “moral responsibility 
is therefore an issue that cannot be decided by scientific investigation” 
(p. 113). Science and scientists have been accused of not thinking “of 
people, of pain, of freedom, and of beauty” (p. 116) and hence Ziman 
concludes that “teaching responsibility in science is also teaching 
science” (p. 117). A Horton (1971) suggested, the greater concern of 
people in the developing world is people and their relationships, and the 
personalized idiom with which they confront the world should be a 
concern in this regard.
Kelly, et al, (1993) criticize Robert K. Merton's conception of the norms 
of science which were largely seen to be valid during their time. These 
Mertonian norms o f science are:
1) Universalism: This assumes that scientific knowledge is 
independent of the personal, social, cultural, and national 
attributes of the scientist.
2) Communism: This assumes knowledge should be 
shared openly within the scientific community.
3) Disinterestedness: This assumes that scientists have 
desire to extend the domain o f human knowledge without 
personal interest such as personal aggrandizement.
4) Organized scepticism: This expects scientists to use 
only empirically established facts in scientific decision 
making and to suspend judgement until the evidencefound.
The Mertonian norms present science as dependent upon value free 
observation (i.e. separation of theory and prior knowledge and 
observation) in inductivist approach experimentation. The knowledge 
thus gained is construed to be absolute and beyond reproach. 
Mundangepfupfu (1988) criticizes science construed as the only valid 
from of knowledge:
... the notion of reality derived from those views of nature is 
limited because the realm of application of scientific beliefs is 
reduced to the observable in the physical world. Science 
operates only within a notion of reality restricted to the physical 
universe and, therefore, cannot explain any other reality or tell 
us if there is or not such a reality (p.49).
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Ill /.nribabu c. at Icasi. sonic science icaehers t»« -tic a' -ue ui tin-, 
limitation of .science and the falsity of pretending that its bounds of 
knowing are limitless (Shumba. 1995b). One ot my interviewee:,.. 
biology teacher said:
It would a 1st> be gc«ni lor science cJaeatton ’ • <-'/■//«• i <.’ me rn v/; 
surrounding tin- instruction o f .science hr ..xp'annng brings 
the learners that science has gat certain limits. There arc son,,, 
spiritual powers, these powers could he go J!\ or liter coma he 
sinister, iinJ scienee is concerned it tth tanghucs or things tnat 
can he investigated hut this does not tide out the cas/e ive  .•</ 
spiritual forces People can go into a iiiounuou and demp/tear: 
there m e spiritual forces that arc sinister winch soi t oj Jtsltti h 
their iimn/s. confuse than, that ests.i. It's something him ,:i;un>! 
he solved hv sciencet they (spiritual loi < * st tire above .<-rteiH e, 
thc\ u\iuscendscience(.Shumba, 1995b, p. 276).
Stanley and Backhouse ( 1994j suggest dial a Uim-crsahst c-"nc.'phon 
o f scienee is problematic bec ause it creates the absurd impression that 
scientists can know 'the trulh' about the world and second, “it 
rationalizes the destruction o f knowledge systems deemed miencr by 
Western standards” (p. 392). Echoing this senrirnonf. Hodson (1993) 
suggests a multicultural perspective in science education which thrives 
on comparative analysis o f .science in other cultures for example, he 
cites evidence iSmolic/ & Nunan, 1975; Sardat. 1989) that in the 
Western mode of the curriculum, the image of a scientist is tha t one of 
the self-assuied, technologically powerful manipulator and controller 
yet Islamic scientists stress the need for humility, respect for what is 
studied, and recognition of the limitations o f science. Among the Maori 
there is appropriate respect and recognition of the spirituality o f land 
forms such as sea mountains, and forests, in Africa, maintaining 
harmonious relationships between people and the natural world is vital. 
Understanding the cultures of people where science has been 
introduced is surely part of the business of science education.
Birch ( 1988) provides an interesting critique of the modern woi Id view 
driven by science and technology as mechanistic and materialistic. It is 
“deficient as a total world view and has left us with a dilemma about 
ethics and values and purposes'” (p. 12) and “our most difficult
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problems (e g., hunger, poverty, war) involves values and purposes" 
(Birch, 1988. p. 19). Birch identifies eight negative consequences ol the 
untrammelled application and belief in the ability of science and 
technology to resolve problems in the modern world, lie provides a 
substantially sacrosanct summary of the majoi criticism of tbe 
classical-empiricist notions <d science, namely:
I ) The fallacy of misplaced concreteness or the fallacy of
reification or the naturalistic fallacy which 'thiiigfU's' natural 
objects and supposes that the human is a machine and thus 
negates the reality that human being experiences and feels and 
wonders. Separates die natural from the human and supposes 
that human 'thought'can he extrapolated and derived from ’what 
is' in the non-human world.
•:) The generic fallacy: Supposes that the origin of something or 
ideas settles the question of its falsehood or its truth.
3) The prosaic fallacy: Refusal to attribute feelings to things that 
feel and failing to acknowledge that die natural world is a 
feeling world.
II fhe fallacy of posteriori reasoning: Assuming that the physical 
environment was made or pre-ordained to fit life and a rejection 
of the notion of chance and accident. I .iving things and humans 
live in this environment without need for self-determination or 
adaptation because the original design is just right.
M Ihe fallacy of objectivity: The notion that science is objective in 
the sense that subjectivity does not enter into scientific analysis; 
rejection of multiple explanations and insensiti vity to values 
and failure to bestow values on facts.
(:>) The dogmatic fallacy: Rejection ol competing or alternative 
systems ofthought or view points.
7) The fallacy of the perfect dictionary: Assuming that single 
words and phrases express accurately Ihe fundamental ideas on 
what we know; not recognizing the role of imagination and 
criticism in ['reference to catchwords and phrases,
8) The bricks-to-babel fallacy of knowledge: A belief in the 
accumulation of facts and division of knowledge created by 
experts and entrusting experts to guide us into truth and right 
action: separation of knowledge domains into disciplines rather 
than demonstrate then unity
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Post-modern views of science and the connection with 
culture
Science education is now seeking to get informed by perspectives from 
both the philosophy and sociology of science. Science is now 
understood to be a socially constituted enterprise “shaped at many 
levels by human values, beliefs, and commitments” (Kelly et at., 1993). 
Contrary to Mcrtonian norms there exists counter norms that suggest 
that the scientific enterprise is value laden. According to Longino (cited 
by Kelly ct al., 1993), two value types permeate science. The 
constitutive values are the science specific values to which serve to 
demarcate what constitutes acceptable scientific practice and/or 
method while the contextual values are the personal, social, and cultural 
commitments inherent in any environment (p. 213). The implications of 
these notions are that:
1) scientific knowledge should be understood as tentative and 
contingent upon the social conditions that govern its 
construction and taught accordingly
2) science education should establish parameters to make students 
aware of the role of social consensus in the construction of 
knowledge
3) socio-cultural values influence the process, content and 
application of scientific knowledge
4) science is not the only cognitive authority for decision making
5) learning science does not necessarily make citizens good public 
decisionmakers
The relativist views concerning science education are reasonably 
grounded in philosophical studies and analysis of the nature o f science. 
In addition to these philosophical and social studies o f science refuting 
the strict objectivism and classical realism of positivist thought 
(Cobem, 1993), a very insightful critique is given by Matthews (2010) 
who support and rationalize a social constructivist view of learning. 
According to this view, learning is an interpretive process, greatly 
influenced by prior knowledge and experience (Posner & Strike, 2007). 
In the learning process, the learner constructs knowledge, not simply 
receive it passively (Cobem, 1993). Posner and Strike (2007) contrast 
conceptual change with the classical empiricist philosophy of Locke
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and Hume which uses the metaphor of tabula rasa lor mind and learning 
and thus neglects the role of prior knowledge and experience in learning 
new matcial. Cobem ( 2 9 9 7 )  views learning as involving the 
negotiation and interpretation. both processes ol which are influenced 
by prior knowledge and experience, '('he key point is that prior 
knowledge and experience obtains from cultural experience and 
socialization. For these masons if is pertinent, as Cobern (2007) 
intimates;
... for science educators to understand the fundamental, 
culturally based beliefs about the world that students bring to 
class, and how these beliefs are supported by students' cultures; 
because science education is successful only to the extent that 
science can find a niche in th<- eouniiive and social-cultural 
milieu ofsin.lenis i p. I I )
Reflective and eonCevtuali/ed science education
It seems, then, that such sensitivity and sentiments for science 
education has relevance to attaining the goal of critical scientific and 
technological literacy. In hix doctoral dissertation. Mundangepfupfu 
(1988) argues for the need to deal with the problem of teaching science 
to students who might have a magieo-traditional conception of the 
world and castigates historical (and current) practice winch accepts the 
antithesis between scientific and traditional beliefs "without 
considering the conceptual differences of world views" (p.3). The 
persistence in science education of notions such as those expressed by 
the likes of Williams (1994). w ho says that "a major goal of science 
educations must be to dispel notions of magic and teleology as 
unscientific" (p. 516), is surely detrimental and indeed disfigures any 
attempts to present a truthful, holistic, and meaningful rendition of 
whole human experience. Reform is critically needed to alter science 
material and science education literature which are mostly presented 
from the vantage point of the scientific world view because, as 
Mundangepfupfu notes, "this bias towards a scientific interpretation of 
the world is arbitrary and construes (reality) as scientific reality” and 
yet, as a way of v iewing the world, scientific beliefs have strengths and 
weaknesses like other world-views (p.3). Mundangepfupfu posits that 
if science teaching in Africa is to be successful:
( ]vcrson Simmlui 239
... must involve a wider eonception of legitimate knowledge 
than the present narrow coneeption of knowledge as scientific 
knowledge. .. .the question of what and how to teach science to 
students who adhere to magico-lraditional beliefs can then be 
approached through the argument that science is a way of 
knowing one aspect of reality and that other world-views 
present alternative ways of knowing the world (p.4).
This rationale is clearly supported in the literature (Cobern, 1993; 
Ogawa, 2007; Ogunniyi, 1988). Clearly, it is no longer the business of 
science education to make students reject their traditional beliefs and 
thinking and accept scientific beliefs and knowledge unqucstioningly. 
Mundangepfupfu rejects the time honoured assumption saying “there is 
nothing to say that the eradication of other beliefs will lead to a better 
understanding of science. Furthermore, science cannot account for all 
phenomena in nature and it is unclear why it is better to have one world­
view rather than many" (p. 86). On a similar point, Stanley and 
Brickhouse (1994) find that the modern science framework is quite 
powerful when applied in certain situations but “Western scientific 
frameworks cannot provide a vantage point beyond other frameworks 
whereby we could judge, once and for all, what we can know" (p. 395). 
They therefore see advantage in multiple perspectives rather than the 
current monological-science-is-best perspective concluding that 
“human interpretation aimed at the realization of new knowledge 
requires the dialogue of multiple perspectives (frameworks)” (p. 395).
Stanley and Brickhouse (1994) suggest that students need to become 
competent in scientific discourse;
... they also need to understand that this is only one particular 
way, among many, or thinking about the natural world. Put 
another way, we believe that teaching a universalistic 
conception of science is misedueative and could potentially 
lead to repeating the negative consequences of a Universalist 
view. ...they can also learn that the form of contemporary 
science is not universal, inevitable, or unchangeable. This kind 
of understanding is needed to encourage critical thinking ... (p. 
396).
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On the same issue, Hodson ( 1994) argues that:
... the overarching goal of Science for All program should he 
critical scientific and technological literacy, and to achieve this 
goal it is necessary both to personalize learning and to pohi mi/e 
science education. Thus my views are rooted very firmly m die 
notion o f critical thinking and social-political action on mattcm 
that relate to scientific, technological, and environmental issue* 
(p.521).
Conclusion
In this regard it becomes essential to dispel the dogma of unquestioned 
science through critical interrogation of Western science relative in 
indigenous thought and belief of adopting cultures. It is not the business 
of science education in developing countries or indeed clsew hcl ;' !y» 
bring about loss of trad i ' Culture is not an obstacle to overcome a* 
Williams (1994) assumes; it is not an obstacle to science or other fm m* 
of thought, belief or knowledge. There is no evidence that !<>••>* • ! 
tradition is necessary condition for the adoption of scienbf'- a v 
points. Scientific progress is in itself not all virtuous and neither is it 
inherently good (Shumba, in press). It is crucial for cultural issues to be 
included in the curriculum. Both cultural issues and science should be 
subjected to critical discourse with the hope that science and tradition 
can be brought into conflation. Wright (2007) rejects the super! icia! 
study of science, attached to an authoritarian pedagogy which conveys 
“that there are probabilities rather than certainties, degrees of 
confidence rather than absolute laws” (p. 374), which may have' die 
positive spill over effect into other areas of experience.
Developments elsewhere show earnest attempts to understand the 
conceptual nature of traditional thought and belief in creating 
innovative approaches that seek to influenee students' understanding of 
science and to inculcate in them the scientifie world view. 1 low ever, 
these well intentioned efforts will come to naught if reflective inquiry 
and analysis targeting science and culture does not occur. What is 
needed is perhaps more of what Matthews (2010) proposes, that 
“science education should be an education about science as well as in 
science” (p. 12).
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